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Economic growth can be decomposed into two components; increases in factor inputs and 
improvements in total factor productivity (TFP), the efficiency with which factors are used.  
Calibration of growth models, using the private rates of return to factors calculated from 
microeconomic studies, suggests that differences in factor inputs explain a relatively small 
proportion of the large differentials in income levels we actually observe across countries and 
that the major force behind these differentials are differences in TFP. (e.g. Klenow and 
Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Prescott (1998)).   
When growth relationships are estimated using macroeconomic data (e.g. Mankiw, 
Romer, and Weil (1992)) a greater role is often found for factor inputs.  As emphasized by 
Mankiw (1997), the potential advantage of estimation is its ability to pick up externalities to 
physical and human capital that appear at the aggregate level but do not affect private returns.  
The estimation of the macroeconomic relationships that underlie economic growth has, however, 
a number of problems.   To be valid, the estimated relationships should correctly specify the 
functional form of the production function (how factor inputs affect output), elucidate the 
dynamics of TFP (how the level, and growth rate, of TFP varies across countries), and control for 
the potential bias caused by reverse causality from income levels to investment in factor inputs.    
  In this paper our focus is on how we model the dynamics of TFP.  One way of modeling 
TFP is to take it to be the same in every country (e.g. Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992)).  It has 
been forcefully argued, however, that there are cross-country differences in TFP levels (e.g. 
Prescott 1998).  The fixed effects approach (e.g. Islam (1995), Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort, 
(1996)) allows for TFP differentials across countries but assumes that these differentials persist 





While we wish to allow for cross-country differences in the level of TFP, we feel that not 
all these differences need be persistent.  To the extent that differences in TFP reflect differences 
in technology, we expect to see these technology gaps close over time as technology diffuses.      
We estimate a model of technology diffusion, but allow for the possibility of some differentials 
in TFP even in the long run, due, for example, to differences in geography and institutions across 
countries.   
  A fundamental difficulty in modeling, and testing, theories of TFP is that we have no 
independent measure of TFP; instead, TFP appears as a residual in the production function.  
Nevertheless, our model of TFP places testable restrictions on the parameters being estimated 
and we can evaluate it using these tests.  In addition, our model encompasses both the fixed 
effects approach (without technological diffusion), and the view that there are no differences in 
TFP across countries in the long run; we can test if these restricted models fit the data. 
  While we focus on the evolution of TFP, in order to model the growth process we also 
need to specify the form of the aggregate production function.  The relative constancy of factor 
shares in GDP suggests a Cobb-Douglas specification for capital and labor inputs, though we 
also try a more general function form suggested by Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000).  Rates of 
return to schooling are fairly constant across the countries of the world; we construct a 
production function that is consistent with this stylized fact.  
A recurrent problem in estimating the aggregate production function is reverse causality.  
It seems likely that higher income leads to higher investment in physical and human capital; this 
means that our estimates of factor productivity may be biased upwards. We identify the effect of 
inputs on output by assuming that while current inputs may depend on current output, current 





shocks. This assumption identifies the productivity of each input; testing its validity (though the 
use of over-identifying restrictions) is an important part of evaluating our model.  
We test this model using cross-country panel data on income growth over the period 
1970-1990.  Surprisingly, we find that our all our parameter estimates on factor returns are very 
close to those found in microeconomic studies; indeed, the differences between our parameter 
estimates and the averages found across micro-studies are statistically insignificant.  This implies 
the absence of externalities in aggregate production and that differences in TFP are the major 
source of cross-country differences in income levels. 
The relationship we derive from our production function and model of technological 
diffusion has similarities to those found in the ￿conditional convergence￿ literature (e.g. Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil (1992), Islam (1995), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)). However, the rationale 
for conditional convergence in our approach is quite different.  Traditionally, ￿conditional 
convergence￿ occurs when a country￿s capital stock and output are lower than their steady-state 
levels.  Catch-up occurs due to a high rate of investment as the capital stock grows towards its 
postulated steady-state level (which depends on the savings rate).   In our model we account for 
the effect of capital accumulation directly and identify the ￿catch-up￿ term in economic growth 
as technological progress.  When a country￿s output is low given its factor inputs we have 
evidence of low TFP, and we expect to see economic growth as TFP converges towards its 
steady state level.  Our results imply that TFP in each country is converging towards a steady 
state level at about 1.8% a year, though the steady state does vary across countries depending on 
their geography and institutions.   
  Section 2 describes our theoretical model and its properties. Section 3 describes the data.  





explicit modeling of the process of technological diffusion is that it places some strong 
restrictions on the parameters in our regressions. In section 4 we also test these restrictions to 
ensure that the data is compatible with the model we use. Section 5 gives our conclusions.      
 
2. Theory 
We want to construct a production function where we model both how inputs and TFP affect 
output and how TFP evolves. We assume that the production function has the form 
) , , ( s L K F A Y =  (1) 
where Y is total GDP, A represents TFP, K is the physical capital stock, L is the labor force, and 
s is the average years of schooling of the workforce.  We begin by modeling the production 
function F and then turn to the issue of how TFP is determined. 
  The relative constancy of the shares of capital and labor in total income across the world 
suggests a Cobb-Douglas functional form for these inputs.  For human capital the story is more 
difficult since we need to separate out the reward to human capital from the reward to raw labor 
in the wage bill.  Unfortunately, wage payments do not distinguish between these two rewards, 
but there have been many microeconomic studies of the effect of human capital on wages, based 
on the work of Mincer (1974).  This relationship is usually taken to have the form:    
01 log jj ws αα =+  (2) 
where wj is the wage of individual j, and sj is his years of schooling.  Note that the semi-log form 
of the relationship implies that schooling exerts a multiplicative rather than additive effect on 
wages.  The marginal product of an extra year of schooling is  j w 1 α .  The coefficient  1 α  is 





earnings of j while studying).  In this framework the rate of return to education is the same for 
each worker.  
Bils and Klenow (2000) report estimates of this equation for 52 countries based on the 
work of Psacharopoulos (1994).  Taking crude averages of the parameter estimates, we find a 
coefficient of 0.091 on schooling. This implies that each year of education raises subsequent 
wages by about 9%. The returns to education reported in Bils and Klenow (2000)  are fairly 
constant across countries and do not vary systematically with national income level or average 
years of schooling of the workforce. This makes using a Cobb-Douglas production function 
including education problematic; with a Cobb-Douglas function the rate of return to education 
(the marginal product of education divided by its cost, which is the output lost by withdrawing a 
worker from the labor force, that is, the marginal product of labor) is inversely proportional to the 
average years of schooling of the workforce. This would imply very high returns to education in 
poor countries where education stocks are low (in excess of ten times the rates of return found in 
the U.S); these high rates are not found in micro-studies.
1    
Instead we consider the aggregate production function 
s e L AK Y φ β α =  (3) 
Using this functional form, and assuming each factor earns its marginal product, α is the 
share of national income that goes to capital while β is the share of national income going to 
wages, which includes both the rewards to labor and to schooling.  The marginal product of a 
worker with average human capital is  L
Y β .  On the other hand, the marginal product of an extra 
year of education is  L
Y φ .  It follows that, if we assume that the only cost of education is the lost 





social rate of return
2 of  β
φ  .  The intuition for this ratio is that the extra year of schooling adds 
proportionately to output, but its cost is the wage forgone, which depends on labor￿s share of 
output.  Using this we can compare the results of estimating a production function like (2) with 
the rates of return found in (1).  
However, this analysis only gives the rate of social return for an average worker.  We can 
calculate the social rate of return for a worker with  j s  years of education as 
) ( s s j − +φ β
φ
   (4) 
which implies that different workers face different rates of return to education. This problem 
must occur in any model in which aggregate output depends only on average (or total) years of 
schooling since, in this case, the marginal benefit of a extra year of schooling is the same no 
matter who has it, while the cost in term of output forgone by withdrawing a working from the 
labor force is lower for workers with low levels of education than for those with high levels of 
education.  If we want to have an aggregate production function that preserves the Mincer 
equation property that the rate of return to education is constant across workers, it needs to 
include the distribution, as well as the average level, of human capital.  
In the interests of simplicity we assume only the total stock of education matters, not its 
distribution.  We can, however, calculate the rate of return to a policy of increasing everyone￿s 
education level by the same amount and compare this with the microeconomic estimates from 
(1).  Increasing everyone￿s education by the same amount has the marginal product  Y φ , while the 
wages forgone are  Y Y s s
j
j β φ β = ∑ − + )) ( ( , so the rate of return to a policy of universal 





  Heckman and Klenow (1997) and Krueger and Lindahl (2000) take a different approach 
to calculating the rate of return to schooling. They add over workers to produce an ￿aggregate 
Mincer equation￿ that appears to imply that the rate of return to schooling in equation (3) is 
simply φ .  However, the ￿aggregate Mincer equation￿ approach is not appropriate in our 
framework.  It implicitly assumes the wage of a worker with no education to be independent of 
the average level of education in the workforce, but it is easy to show that the production 
function given by equation (3) implies that the wage (i.e. the marginal product) of an uneducated 
worker does depend on the average level of education.  This issue is addressed in detail in the 
Appendix.  
  Taking logs of the aggregate production function (3), we can derive an equation for the 
log of aggregate output in country i at time t 
it it it it it s l k a y φ β α + + + =    (5) 
where yit, kit, and lit are the logs of Yit, Kit, and Lit respectively, while the schooling variable, sit, 
is in levels.  Equation (5) is an identity, but in practice  it a , the level of total factor productivity in 
country i at time t, is not observed and appears as an error term in the equation when we come to 
estimation.  
  We now address the crucial issue of how to model this error term.  We assume TFP  
follows the process: 
it it it v a a + = *  where  it t t i it v v ε σ ρ + + = −1 ,   
where  t σ  is a common worldwide shock (due, for example, to macroeconomic conditions) at 
time t, and it ε  is a country specific random shock. Each country has a long run steady state level 
of TFP given by 
*
it a .  One simple approach is to imagine that  *





but changes over time, so that  t it a a = *  .  In this case, v it represents a country specific 
￿technology gap￿ from the common world technological level at time t.  This deviation from 
steady state TFP levels may be persistent, but as time passes, TFP levels converge the world TFP 
level at the rate  ρ − 1 . The rate at which TFP converges measures the speed of technological 
diffusion. 
  While technology may eventually diffuse, some countries may enjoy long run advantages 
in TFP that do not get eroded over time.  For example, while technology may diffuse slowly as 
patent protection runs out, differences in institutional arrangements may persist unchanged 
throughout the time periods we consider.  In addition, geographical factors may mean that some 
locations have productivity differentials, even in the long run.  This suggests that we should 
model long run TFP as   t i it a x f a + = ) (
* , where  the  variables in i x are country specific factors 
that may affect long run TFP.  For example, Hall and Jones (1999) argue that institutions and 
￿social infrastructure￿ can affect productivity, while Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) 
emphasize the role of geography.  In practice, we use the percentage area in the tropics and a 
measure of institutional quality as factors that determine long run TFP levels.   
For estimation purposes it is useful to turn our production function into a growth 
equation. Differencing equation (5) gives us 
it v it s it l it k t a it y ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ φ β α  (6) 
Substituting out the error term, and noting that the lagged productivity gap  1 , − t i v is the 
difference between actual and predicted output at time t-1 generates: 
 






it t i t i t i t i t i y s l k a x f ε φ β α ρ + − + + + + − + − − − − − ) ) ( )( 1 ( 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1    (7) 
 
Growth in output can be decomposed into four components.  The first is the growth of world 
total factor productivity plus any macroeconomic ￿shock￿ to world output.  The second is the 
growth of inputs, capital, labor, and schooling.  The third a catch-up term as some of the 
country￿s TFP gap,  1 , − t i v , is closed and the country converges, at the rate  ρ − 1 , to its steady 
state level of TFP.  Finally there is an idiosyncratic shock to the country￿s TFP,  it ε .  
In the special case that  1 = ρ  the lagged level terms in equation (7) dissappear.  Our 
approach therefore encompases the estimation of the production function in first differences as 
advocated by Pritchett (1996) and Krueger and Lindahl (2000), and we can test if this restriction 
holds. Taking first differences nets out any fixed effects in TFP. Therefore, testing 1 = ρ  tests the 
null of a fixed effects model, with persistent differentials in TFP, against the alternative that TFP 
differentials narrow over time due to technological diffusion
3.  Our model also encompasses the 
special case where there is technological diffusion but that the steady state level of TFP is the 
same in every country; we can test this by testing that the country specific variables xi have zero 
coefficients.  
Equation (7) is essentially a model of conditional convergence.  The speed of 
convergence,  ρ − 1 , is the rate at which TFP gaps are converging.  This is is sharp contrast with 
models  (such as Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and Islam (1995)) that take TFP differentials 
across countries to be fixed;  the speed of convergence in these models depends on the time 
period it takes for capital stocks to reach their steady state levels given fixed investment rates.  





up term, the effect of the gap between actual output and steady state output given current input 
levels, as the impact of a TFP gap.   
Estimating equation (7) has the potential difficulty that the contemporaneous growth rates 
of factor inputs are very likely to be endogenous and responsive to the current TFP shock,  t i, ε .  
We overcome this problem by instrumenting these current input growth rates with lagged input 
growth rates.  We assume that these lagged input growth rates and the lagged levels of inputs are 
uncorrolated with  t i, ε , the current shock to TFP.  This is quite compatible with lagged TFP 
levels and expected TFP growth (the catchup term in equation 7) affecting previous input 
decisions.  The argument that the lagged input levels are uncorrolated with the current shock to 
TFP is the real rationale for estimating equation (7) rather than the level relationship in (5).  If we 
were to estimate the level realtionship, there would be serious worry that the current input levels 
were correlated with the current level of TFP (which, after all, affects output and the pool of 
resources available for investment). In the levels equation, using lagged input levels as 
instruments is not appropriate because the autocorrelation in TFP over time means that lagged 
input levels can be correlated with lagged TFP levels which in turn are correlated with current 
TFP levels. 
The lagged growth rates of inputs, and other variables we use, are valid instruments 
provided they are uncorrolated with future output shocks.  We can test this using overidentifying 
restrictions.  Another important set of restrictions imposed by our model is that the coefficients 
on each lagged input level and its current growth rate should be the same. Failure to satisfy these 





In our model each time period has a constant term in its determination of cross country 
growth at time t, given by:  
1 ) 1 ( − − + + ∆ = t t t t a a d ρ σ    (8) 
If we have T time periods in the model, we essentially have T time dummies, determined 
by 2T+1 parameters involving worldwide total factor productivity levels and output shocks. 
These parameters are therefore unidentified. We cannot distinguish between worldwide technical 
progress and a worldwide output shock.  Even if we assume that there are no output shocks, we 
still cannot distinguish between worldwide average growth caused by technological innovation 
and growth caused by technological diffusion as countries catch up to a pre-existing world 
technology level.  We could identify the model by making some arbitrary assumptions (e.g. that a 
particular country was at the technological frontier in the base year), but these arbitrary 
assumptions would completely detemine the level and growth rate of technology.   
  This lack of identification seems fundamental; it is impossible using only data on world 
average TFP improvements to decide if these are due to the incorporation of existing technology 
into production or the incorporation of new technology invented during the period.  While these 
parameters are unidentified they affect only the constant term and do not hamper the estimation 
of the other parameters in the model.    
 
3. Data 
We construct a panel of countries observed every ten years from 1960 to 1990.  Output data 
(GDP) is obtained from the Penn World Tables version 5.6 (see Summers and Heston (1991) for 
a description).  We obtain total output by multiplying the real per capita GDP measured in 1985 





Data on economically active population are from the International Labor Organization 
(1997).  Our labor supply is given by their estimates of the total economically active population 
in the given year, though this does not adjust for the fact that some fraction of the labor force is 
unemployed and therefore should not be counted as providing labor inputs.  Nor are we able to 
adjust for the hours worked of  the labor force.  Schooling is measured by the average total years 
of schooling of the population aged 15 plus from Barro-Lee (2000).   
  Our capital stock series for each country is computed by a perpetual inventory method.  
We initialize the capital series in the first year for which there is investment data in the Penn 
World Tables (version 5.6), setting it equal to the average investment/GDP ratio in the first five 
years of data, multiplied by the level of GDP in the initializing period, and divided by .07, our 
assumed depreciation rate.  This is the capital stock we would expect in the initial year if the 
investment/GDP ratio we use is representative of previous rates.   Each succeeding period’s 
capital is given by current capital minus depreciation at 7%, plus the level of current investment.  
Our capital stock series has wider coverage than Summers-Heston variable for capital 
stock per worker, kapw, which is only available for 62 countries from 1965 onwards. Where the 
two overlap, the correlation coefficient between the log levels of our series and theirs is 0.97, 
indicating that the two series are very similar.  For many countries, investment series do not start 
until 1960, suggesting that our capital stock data for the 1960￿s may be suspect because of the 
way we construct the initial stock of capital.  Because of depreciation, by 1970 the capital stock 
estimates become fairly independent of the initializing assumption used; we therefore limit our 






Our measure of institutional quality is the good governance variable from Knack and 
Keefer (1995), while percentage of land area in the tropics comes from Gallup, Sachs and 
Mellinger (1999). 
4. Estimation and Results 
We begin by estimating equation (7); the results are reported in column (1) of table 1. 
Each regression is estimated by nonlinear least squares, and all contemporaneous growth rates of 
inputs are instrumented with their lagged growth rates and the lagged growth of output.  Time 
dummies (not reported) are included. 
In Column (1) of Table 1 we report results where we include physical capital, human 
capital and labor as inputs and assume that the steady state level of TFP is the same for every 
country.  We find coefficients of close to 0.4 on capital and 0.6 labor, which seems a little high 
on capital compared to the evidence of its share of income. The sum of these coefficients on 
labor and capital is close to one and we cannot reject the restriction of constant returns to scale.  
Our estimate of the coefficient on schooling translates into a social rate of return of 23.1%, which 
is somewhat higher than the average of 9.1% found in micro studies.  However, our estimate is 
not very well determined and we cannot reject the hypothesis that it is the same as the micro-
estimate of 9.1%.  The catch-up coefficient is 0.187, indicating that TFP levels are converging at 
a rate of about 2% a year. 
We include a number of specification tests in table 1. Equation (7) implies that the 
coefficients on the growth rates on inputs and their effect in the level part of the regression 
should be the same.  These restrictions will fail in a model with a more complex error structure; 





period, so that the effect of current input growth is less than the long run impact of the level of 
inputs.  We can test this by estimating the unrestricted model, allowing the coefficients on the 
growth and level terms to differ for each input, and testing that the equality restrictions in 
equation (7) hold.  In column (1), we find that we cannot reject the three equality restrictions (in 
fact the level and growth rate estimates of the coefficients are surprisingly close).      
The inputs growth rates in equation (7) are endogenous and may be influenced by the 
growth rate of TFP during the period (the error term). This is likely in the ten year time periods 
we are using, since investments made later in the period will certainly be made in the light of 
TFP growth early in the period. Therefore, all our input growth terms are instrumented with 
lagged variables (the lagged input growth rates and lagged output growth) from before the current 
period.  However, this  identification strategy fails if lagged variables help predict the future 
productivity ￿shock￿ since in this case agents are able to predict the shock and base their input 
decisions on it.  We use the Hausman specification test to test the hypothesis that the lagged 
variables are valid instruments; the test does not reject our instruments.  
We now consider adding a geographic variable, the percentage of land area in the tropics, 
and an institutional quality variable to the model. Land area is fixed throughout the period and 
while institutional quality is measured in 1980, we take it as representing a level that is also fixed 
over the whole period.  If our model in column (1) is correct, and the error term represents an 
unpredictable ￿shock￿, we can add these variables as valid instruments.  We try this approach in 
column (2) of table 1. The results in column (2) are similar to those found in column (1) with one 
notable exception.  Our test for instrument validity generates a decisive rejection.  This suggests 
that land area in the tropics and institutional quality are not valid instruments and can in fact help 





In column (3) we add land area in the tropics and institutional quality as explanatory 
variables in their own right by including them as determinants on long run steady state TFP.  We 
find institutional quality to have a positive impact on long run TFP at the 5% significance level, 
while the percentage of the country￿s land area that is in the tropics has a negative coefficient, 
though it is not quite significant at the 10% level.   This suggests that long run steady state TFP 
varies across countries.  We estimate that a country with the best possible institutions (score 10) 
has about 150% higher steady state TFP than a country with the worst (score zero), while a 
country wholly in the tropics has a TFP level about 50% below that of a temperate country.  Note 
that these estimated effects are only their effects on TFP.  Poor geography and institutions may 
also lead to low returns to, and investment in, capital and education, so that their total impact on 
output may be much larger.    
The capital and labor coefficients are close to 1/3 and 2/3 respectively which seems 
reasonable.  The coefficients on capital and schooling fall when we add geographical factors; the 
estimates on these coefficients in columns (1) and (2) are likely to be biased upwards due to 
countries with favorable geography having higher TFP and income and higher induced levels of 
factor accumulation than expected. Our estimated coefficient on schooling in column (3) implies 
a rate of return of around 8.4% a year but the standard error on this estimate is large.  The fact 
that schooling is not statistically significant in column (3) of table 1 might be taken as evidence 
that schooling does not affect growth, but this is not the appropriate inference.  Formally, we 
cannot reject (at the 5% significance level) the null hypothesis that schooling has no effect ￿ but 
this is very different from accepting the null.  In fact, we have a great deal of microeconomic 
evidence that the rate of return to schooling is around 9% per annum; this figure is a more 





hypothesis either, implying we cannot reject the hypothesis that there are no externalities to 
schooling over and above its private return.
4  
In all the specifications (1) ￿ (3) the data appear to accept constant returns to scale.  
Imposing constant returns to scale allows us to divide the production function through by L, the 
labor force, so that we can regard equation (4) as a regression explaining the growth on income 
per worker by the growth of capital and education per worker, and improvements in TFP. We can 
then rewrite equation (7) as  
it it it t t it it s L K l a L Y ∆ + ∆ + + ∆ = ∆ φ α σ ) / ( ) / log(  
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Our estimates of this relationship are reported in column (4) of table 1. Imposing constant returns 
should improve efficiency of estimation, but in practice does not much affect the results.  
Overall, the picture that emerges from table 1 is that the macro-results are surprisingly 
close to the results found in microeconomic studies. In every case we find that we cannot reject 
the hypothesis that the macroeconomic estimates on the returns to schooling are the same as the 
microeconomic evidence.  The coefficient on capital of around 1/3 is close to its factor share 
suggesting that its private reward reflects its aggregate productivity. There are large gaps in total 
factor productivity across countries but these gaps are being closed at the rate of about 2% a year. 
As we would expect, countries with better governance tend to have higher steady state levels of 
TFP while those in the tropics have lower TFP.   
The specification tests in column (3) and (4) of table 1 are satisfactory.  However, the 
actual relationship may be more complex. We experimented with a number of generalizations of 





of substitution production function by including the square of log capital per worker term in the 
production function given by equation (5).  A second idea is to allow the diffusion of technology 
to depend on the education level, as suggested by Nelson and Phelps (1966).  This implies that 
countries with higher education may have less persistence in their technology gap; we also allow 
high education counties to have better access to new innovations. However, adding these effects 
did not improve the fit of the model significantly.
5   
Finally, there is clearly an issue as to what variables to include as determinants on long 
run TFP.  We experimented with a number of candidates, including the Sachs and Warner (1995) 
openness measure and the ethic fractionalization measure used by Easterly and Levine (1997). 
However, we found none that added significantly to the fit of our regression once we include the 
percentage of the country￿s area that lies in the tropics and the quality of its institutions.   
 
5. Conclusion 
Our model accounts for economic growth by the growth of factor inputs, technological 
innovation and technological diffusion.  We find no evidence that the macro-economic effects of 
capital accumulation and schooling are any greater to those found in micro studies.  This suggests 
the absence of externalities at the aggregate level and that calibration studies based on 
microeconomic evidence on private returns provide reasonable pictures of the proximate sources 
of economic growth.  As usual, we find evidence of conditional convergence in the growth data, 
but our framework allows us to interpret this specifically as evidence of technological diffusion. 
The fact that we find no externalities puts the emphasis in explaining cross-country 
differences in income levels on how and why TFP varies across countries.  As Prescott (1998) 





results suggest that steady state TFP varies systematically across country with their geography 
and institutions but that convergence to this steady state level, through technological diffusion, is 
quite slow.   
 
Appendix 
Heckman and Klenow (1997) and Krueger and Lindahl (2000) derive their result by arguing that 
we can average equation (1) over workers.  This gives a figure for the average of log wages.  If, 
however, we assume that the distribution of wages is lognormal, the log of average wages is 
equal to the log of the median wage plus half the variance of wages (Hastings and Peacock 
(1975)).  But, for a lognormal distribution, the log of the median wages equals the average of log 
wages (since log wages have a symmetrical distribution).  Hence 








log log α σ α σ + + = + =    (A1) 
where σ  is the standard deviation of log wages.  Now if we assume that workers are paid their 
marginal products, we can calculate the marginal product of workers with each level of human 
capital from our aggregate production function and then add over workers to give 
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This appears to be consistent with the aggregated Mincer equation (equation (A1) above) where 
the intercept of the wage equation varies across countries due to differences in total factor 
productivity A, capital per worker K/L, and a scale effect that depends on the size of the labor 
force (note that this dependence on L disappears if we have constant returns to scale, so 





education in the micro and macro equations can be compared directly so that φ , the coefficient 
on schooling, must be the return to education. However, this is not so.   
The flaw in the argument is that when we aggregate the Mincer equation in (A1) we 
implicitly assumed that  0 α was a constant, independent of the average level of education.  But 
from equation (1) it is clear that  0 α is the log wage of a worker with no education.  While this 
can be regarded as fixed in a microeconomic study within a country, with our production 
function the wage of such a worker depends not only on TFP and capital per worker, but also on 
the average level of education.  For example, assuming our production function (2) holds, and 
taking the simple case where A, K and L are normalized to unity and setting the wage of a 




s w φ φ β φ β α + − = − = = ) log( ) log( log 1 1 0 0  (A3) 
This clearly implies that the wage earned by an uneducated worker depends on the average stock 
of education.
6  Given our production function there is a fallacy of aggregation in (A1); the 
parameter  0 a is not a constant but should be written as a function of the average level of 
education.  That is, the correct formulation of the ￿aggregate Mincer equation￿ is  









log log  (A3) 
which shows explicitly the dependence of the wage of an uneducated worker on the average level 
of education in the economy as well as other factors (such as the capital labor ratio), x.  The 
￿aggregate Mincer equation￿ given by (A1) is only valid if  0 a  does not depend on the average 
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Year dummies are included throughout. 
Estimates have standard errors in parenthesis, *(**) denotes statistical significance at the 5% level (1%) 
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1 Using a Cobb-Douglas functional form also implies the growth rate of output depends on the 
growth rate of schooling so that we should see exceptionally large growth effects in countries, 
e.g. such as those in Africa,  that have very low education levels but increase their education 
stocks a little (giving a high growth rate of schooling).  The absence of such large growth effects 
in the data may lead to the conclusion that education does not matter, when it is really the 
functional form being employed that is to blame.    
2 The social rate of return is sometimes used to denote the return to schooling in terms of wage 
premium relative to the cost of both student time and teaching inputs. Here we use it to mean the 
increase in aggregate output relative to the cost of student time, which is directly comparable to 
the estimates of the private return in the literature that measure wage premium relative only to 
cost of student time.  
3 Formally, if we start with an encompassing model with both fixed effects and technological 
diffusion the ￿catch-up￿ term in equation (7) should still contain fixed effects.  However, under 
the null of fixed effects alone no catch up term of any type should appear and so  1 = ρ  is still a 
valid test of fixed effects against a more general model even when ai in equation (7) is not a fixed 
effect. 
4 The argument that schooling has no effect on growth would be quite strong if we could not 
reject a zero coefficient and the standard errors on the estimate were small enough to reject the 
9% rate of return found in microeconomic studies.  This would imply that the individual returns 
to schooling might be due to improvements in rent seeking ability that were not reflected in 
aggregate productivity.  
5 The squared capital per worker term is positive and statistically significant when we exclude the 
geographical and institutional quality variables, but this is likely due to reverse causality; 
countries with good geography having higher TFP and so higher income levels that in turn 
generate high levels of factor inputs. 
6 Note that this formula holds for low levels of average education.  If average education levels are 
high enough the marginal product of an uneducated worker may be negative (his negative impact 
in lowering the average years of schooling outweighs the pure effect of his labor supply) and he 
should not be employed.    
 
 